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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final action by the Utah State Insurance Department in a 
formal adjudicative action. As such, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997) and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Background. 
A State agency over a regulated industry sends a notice of commencement of 
adjudicative proceedings against an individual, the individual's wife, and a company 
owned by the individual and his wife. The individual is president of the company, and his 
wife is vice president. All three have licenses from the State agency, and the individual 
and his wife are the only licensees listed on the license of the company. Pursuant to 
statute, the adjudicative proceeding is commenced by the mailing of separate notices of 
the notice and a complaint to each of the three at the business address of each, which each 
is required by statute to have on file with the State agency, and to be kept current. The 
notice states that a failure to file an answer within 30 days may result in default being 
entered, and the complaint asks as part of the relief requested that the licenses of each be 
revoked. The mailings are sent via certified mail, return receipt requested. The return 
receipt from the company is received by the State agency. Separate courtesy copies of the 
notice and complaint are also mailed to the individual and to his wife at their home 
address, which they are also required by statute to keep on file with the State agency, and 
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to be kept current. An additional copy of the notice and complaint is mailed to an 
attorney who had communicated on behalf of the company with the State agency about 
the matter under investigation by the State agency within a month before the notice and 
complaint were mailed. None of the mailings are ever returned to the State agency as 
undelivered. When no response is received from any of the parties, default and default 
judgment are entered against all three, and the licenses of all three are revoked. 
The individual says he never received any of the copies of the notice or complaint. 
He asserts that during the time the notice and complaint were mailed, he was under a 
doctor's care and was unable to work at the company's business address, although he says 
he did go into the business on occasion, but then only for a few minutes each time. He 
states that during this time, the company was being managed solely by his wife. He says 
that during the period the notice and complaint would have been sent, his wife informed 
him the State agency was investigating the company, and that she was working to resolve 
the problems. He understood she had retained an attorney to assist her, an attorney with 
whom he later discusses the sale of the company to another company. He claims mail 
addressed to him at his home or at the company was not being given to him by anyone at 
the company or anywhere else, and that neither his wife nor the attorney ever informed 
him of the adjudicative proceedings. He asserts that to the extent he was required to 
respond to the notice and complaint, he reasonably relied on the attorney to make any 
necessary response. Finally, he states that he has been living elsewhere, and has not 
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recently been informed of any matters relating to the company. The individual has never 
filed a change of business address or home address with the State agency. 
B. Issues. 
1. Does a statute which provides that service is complete upon mailing of a 
notice of commencement of adjudicative proceedings and a complaint to the last know 
address of the party require that the party actually receive the notice and complaint for the 
service to be effective? (R. at 26) 
2. Did the State agency abuse its discretion in determining the alleged failure 
of the individual to receive any of the mailings did not constitute "mistake", or "excusable 
neglect", such that a default and default judgment entered against the individual should be 
set aside under Rule 60(b)(1)? (R. at 25-27,53-56,65,107-111,116-117) 
3. Did the State agency abuse its discretion in determining that the 
individual's being under a doctor's care and unable to work at his business address, 
although he did go into the business on occasion, did not constitute "mistake", or 
"excusable neglect" for the individual's not responding to the notice and complaint, such 
that a default and default judgment entered against the individual should be set aside 
under Rule 60(b)(1)? (R. at 25-27, 53-56,65,107-111,116-117) 
4. Did the State agency abuse its discretion in determining that the failure of 
the individual to inquire further of his wife, or to ask the attorney, about the investigation 
of the company of which he was president, his wife was vice-president, and he and his 
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wife were the only licensees on the company's license, did not constitute "mistake", or 
"excusable neglect" for the individual's not responding to the notice and complaint, such 
that a default and default judgment entered against the individual should be set aside 
under Rule 60(b)(1)? (R. at 25-27,53-56,65,107-111,116-117) 
5. Did the State agency abuse its discretion in determining that if the attorney 
was negligent in not responding to the notice and complaint, the negligence would be 
imputed to the individual, so that the attorney's failure to respond did not constitute 
"mistake", or "excusable neglect" for the individual's not responding to the notice and 
complaint, such that a default and default judgment entered against the individual should 
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(1)? (R. at 25-27, 53-56, 65,107-111,116-117) 
6. Did the State agency abuse its discretion by determining all the facts 
presented by the individual as grounds for setting aside the default and default judgment 
related to grounds that fit within the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1), and therefore the 
same grounds could not be asserted as grounds under Rule 60(b)(6) (formerly Rule 
60(b)(7))? (R. at 108,116.) 
C Standard of Review. 
The standard for reversing a trial court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is abuse 
of discretion. Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205 (Utah 1998). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-312(l)* 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3* 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46M1* 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46M3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46M6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) 
Copies of the statutes with asterisks are in the addendum. Copies of the other 
statutes are found in the addendum of the Petitioner's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Utah State Insurance Department1 ("Department"), through an administrative 
adjudicative proceeding ("Adjudicative Proceeding"), revoked the title insurance agent 
licenses it had issued to Ronald G. Black ("Mr. Black") and his wife, Kathi Black, and the 
1
 Mr. Black's initial brief refers a number of times to the "Commission". In all 
likelihood, many, if not most, of those references should actually be to the "Department". 
Referring to the Department as the "Commission" is a common error which is caused by 
the title given to the head of the Department. Because the head of the Department is 
called the Commissioner of Insurance, many people assume the agency the Commissioner 
heads must be a commission. While this is often true in Utah state government and 
elsewhere, the Commissioner of Insurance is the head of the Insurance Department, rather 
than an insurance commission. 
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title agency license the Department had issued to Black's Title, Inc. ("Black's Title"), a 
company owned and operated by Mr. and Kathi Black. (Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and 
Black's Title are sometimes referred to herein as the "Black Respondents".) The 
Department commenced the Adjudicative Proceeding in the only manner provided by 
statute, by mailing a copy of a notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding and a copy of z 
complaint to each of the Black Respondents at the business address of each of the Black 
Respondents, which addresses were on file with the Department as required by law. The 
notice and complaint were mailed to each via certified mail with a return receipt 
requested, neither of which the Department was required to do. Additional copies of the 
notice and complaint were mailed to an attorney who had appeared with Kathi Black at 
meetings with Department personnel prior to the commencement of the Adjudicative 
Proceeding. When none of the Black Respondents filed any kind of response to the 
notice and complaint, default and default judgment were entered against all the Black 
Respondents, and their respective licenses were revoked. 
Three months after the default and default judgment were entered, the Black 
Respondents filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Rule 55 
and Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. Mr. Black then retained separate legal counsel and filed a 
supplemental motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The motions were 
denied, with the presiding officer pointing out that the only possible grounds the Black 
Respondents had cited for setting aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b) appeared 
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to be "mistake" or "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1), and there was no supporting 
evidence for making a finding in favor of the Black Respondents in either of those areas. 
A similar finding was made by the Commissioner of Insurance ("Commissioner") in 
denying a request to reverse the presiding officer's decision not to set aside the default 
and default judgment. Mr. Black appealed the Commissioner's decision, but Kathi Black 
and Black's Title did not2 
B. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Department commenced the Adjudicative Proceeding against the Black 
Respondents on October 9,1997, by mailing a copy of a "Notice of Formal Adjudicative 
Proceeding and Pre-Conference" ("Notice") and of a "Complaint" ("Complaint") to Mr. 
Black, his wife, Kathi Black, and Black's Title Inc., at the address of Black's Title, which 
was the business address Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title, which was on file 
with the Department pursuant to statute. (R. at 7) Separate sets of the Notice and 
2
 While Black's Title and Kathi Black did not appeal either of the Department's 
refusals to set aside the default and default judgment, the facts surrounding the situations 
of Black's Title and Kathi Black are so inextricably entwined with Mr. Black's own facts 
and positions that the Department must cite those facts frequently throughout its 
argument. By citing facts relating to Black's Title and Kathi Black, the Department is not 
attempting to keep bringing the names of Black's Title and Kathi Black to the Court's 
attention, hoping the Court will keep being reminded that Black's Title and Kathi Black 
did not appeal the Department's order. Black's Title and Kathi Black no doubt have their 
own reasons why they did not appeal the Department's order, and the Department is not 
privy to those reasons. If all reference to Black's title and Kathi Black could have been 
avoided, it would have been. Where it can be avoided in the Department's argument, the 
Department has attempted to do so. Where, however, reference is needed to present the 
entire factual picture to the Court, reference has been made. 
7 
Complaint were sent to each of the Black Respondents, and each mailing was sent via 
certified mail, with a return receipt requested. The return receipt mailed to Black's Title 
was signed and returned to the Department. (R. at 23) On that same day, separate sets of 
the Notice and Complaint were also mailed to Mr. Black and to Kathi Black their home 
address, which was also on file with the Department, and to George S. Diumenti4, an 
attorney in Bountiful, Utah. (R. at 8) The Notice stated that if an answer was not 
returned within 30 days, default could be entered. (R. at 1) The Complaint sought as part 
of the relief requested the revocation of the licenses of all three Black Respondents. (R. 
at 5-6.) When none of the Black Respondents filed any kind of response within the time 
allowed by statute, default and default judgment were entered against Mr. Black, Kathi 
Black, and Black's Title, and the licenses of each were revoked. (R. at 9) Three months 
after the default and default judgment were entered, the Black Respondents moved the 
Department to set aside the default and default judgment. (R. at 15.) Finding there were 
no grounds for granting setting aside the default and default judgment, and specifically 
that there was not any "mistake or "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1), the presiding 
officer denied the motion. (R. at 64.) The Black Respondents requested the Insurance 
3
 This page, which is found between pages 2 and 3 of the record, was apparently 
not numbered. 
4
 The attorney's name is George S. Diumenti. Unfortunately, the certificate of 
mailing spelled his last name as "Dimmenti", and the presiding officer and the 
Commissioner both continued the error into their written orders. 
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Commissioner ("Commissioner") for agency review to reverse the (R. at 68,71), but the 
Commissioner denied the requests for the same reasons the presiding officer had denied 
he motions to set aside the default and default judgment. (R. at 114) 
Prior to November 12,1997, Mr. Black and Kathi Black each held a title agent 
license, which licenses had been issued by the Department. Prior to that same date, 
Black's Title held a title agency license which had also been issued by the Department. 
Mr. Black and Kathi Black were the owners of Black's Title, and were the sole title 
agents shown on the title agency license Black's Title. Mr. Black and Kathi Black also 
controlled and were officers of Black's Title, with Mr. Black serving as president and 
Kathi Black as vice-president. (R. at 3-4,12) 
As licensees of the Department, the Black Respondents were each required to 
provide the Department with their business addresses, and Mr. Black and Kathi Black 
were required to provide the Department with the address of their residence, as well. As 
licensees of the Department, each of the Black Respondents was also required to advise 
the Department of any change in any address within 30 days of the change. (Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-23-312(l), R. at 65) 
The Notice provided the following information: an adjudicative proceeding had 
been commenced against Black's Title, Mr.ald Black, and Kathi Black; a written response 
to the Complaint was required within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the Complaint, 
and a failure to respond within that period of time could result in default being taken 
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against the non-responding party; a pre-hearing conference was set for December 3,1997, 
and failure to appear at the pre-hearing conference could result in default being taken 
against the non-appearing party; and a written response to the Complaint and attendance 
at the pre-hearing conference were both required. (R. at 1-2) The Complaint, after citing 
the allegations against the Black Respondents, requested as a remedy that the title 
insurance licenses of Black's Title, Mr. Black, and Kathi Black be revoked. (R. at 5-6) 
Separate sets of the Notice and Complaint was mailed to Mr. Black, Kathi Black, 
and Black's Title at 110 West Center Street, P. O. Box 219, Bountiful, Utah 84011-0219, 
which is address each of the Black Respondents had on file with the Department as a 
principal business address. Separate sets of the Notice and Complaint were also mailed to 
Mr. Black and Kathi Black at 675 North 800 West, West Bountiful, Utah 84087, which 
was the address each had on file with the Department as a home address. Another set was 
mailed to George Diumenti, a Bountiful attorney. (R. at 7.) 
Thirty (30) days from October 9, 1997 - the date the copies of the Notice and 
Complaint were mailed - was November 8,1997, but since November 8 was a Saturday, 
a written response to the Complaint was not due until Monday, November 10,1997. 
By the close of business on Monday, November 10,1997, the Department had 
received no response of any kind - written or otherwise - from Mr. Black, or Kathi Black 
or Black's Title- (R.at9) 
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On November 12,1997, default and default judgment was entered against the 
Black Respondents, and the title agent licenses of Mr. Black and Kathi Black, and the title 
agency license of Black's Title, were all revoked. (R. at 9) 
On February 11,1998, a "Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment" 
("Motion") was filed with the Department on behalf of the Black Respondents. (R. at 15) 
At that same time, an answer ("Answer") to the Complaint was filed on behalf of Black 
Respondents (R. at 12), along with an accompanying memorandum of supporting points 
and authorities (R. at 18) and Kathi Black's affidavit (R. at 23A). The Motion and 
Answer were filed on behalf of the Black Respondents by Milo S. Marsden, Jr. ("Mr. 
Marsden"), of Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson & Bell. 
In her affidavit, Kathi Black admitted she had delivered "documents and mail in 
the [Adjudicative Proceeding] to [Mr. Diumenti], and was made aware shortly after 
January 18,1998 that a written response should have been filed in the complaint in this 
matter on or before about November 9,1997." She continued that, "It was then I learned 
that no written response had been made. I assumed the responses had been made and that 
a hearing was to be set." (R. at 23A-23B) 
The statement of points and authorities in support of the Motion filed by Mr. 
Marsden asserted that in September of 1997, Kathi Black had received a letter from the 
Department, proposing a meeting on September 8,1997. The letter asserted certain 
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concerns the Department had regarding Black's Title, and requested the production of 
certain documents. The statement of points and authorities continued: 
6. Following these requests, Kathi Black met with [Mr, Diumenti]. 
7. By letter dated September 8,1997, M. Gayle (sic) Lemmon ["Mr. 
Lemmon", staff counsel for the Department] wrote to [Mr. Diumenti] that 
Mr. Lemmon had reviewed the loan documents which had been delivered 
by Kathi Black and requested current financial statements for [Black's 
Title] explaining changes from the December 31,1996 balance sheet to the 
then present. 
8. On September 18,1997, [Mr. Lemmon] faxed to [Mr. Diumenti] 
setting September 22,1997 as the date for production of the requested 
information. 
* * * * * 
13. [Mr. Diumenti] maintains that he never saw the [Complaint]; that 
Mr. Robinson [an unidentified person still unknown to the Department] 
spoke to Helen Cunningham [the Department's investigator] directly about 
the complaint; that [Mr. Diumenti] was advised of the "suspension", and 
that subsequently [Mr. Diumenti] met with Helen Cunningham and asked 
her to provide him with a copy of the [Complaint]; and that [Mr. Diumenti] 
told Helen Cunningham that he represented the corporation [presumably 
Black's Title]. 
14. [The Black Respondents] acknowledge that there is an October 9, 
1997 notice of formal adjudicative proceeding and pre-conference 
addressed to Black's Title, Inc., Ronald G. Black, and Kathi Black, stating 
that a written response must be received within 30 days of the mailing date, 
i.e. October 9,1997, and that a pre-hearing conference was set for 
December 3,1997 at 10:30 a.m. 
15 Kathi Black states Mr. Diumenti notified her that the hearing had 
been cancelled (sic). 
16. On December 7,1997, [Mr. Diumenti] notified Kathi Black, Ronald 
Black, and Black's Title, Inc. that each needed its own attorney and legal 
representation. 
* * * * * 
However, none of the foregoing was attested to by an affidavit, nor was any other proof 
offered of the facts asserted therein. (R. at 19-20) 
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Shortly thereafter, Mr. Black retained separate legal counsel, and since that time, 
Mr. Black has been represented by the same legal counsel he retained at that time. Mr. 
Black filed his affidavit (R. at 34) and a supplemental memorandum in support of the 
Motion. (R. at 38) 
In his affidavit, Mr. Black stated as follows: 
1. During the last half of 1997 and for some time before, I was under a 
doctor's care and was unable to work at [Black's Title]. 
2. I continue under a doctor's care at this time and I continue to be 
unable to work. 
3. During the time I was unable to work at Black's Title, the company 
was managed solely by Kathi Black. 
4. During the last half of 1997,1 was at the business office of Black's 
Title at 110 West Center Street, Bountiful, Utah only on a few occasions 
and then only for a few minutes each. 
5. Sometime during the fall of 1997,1 was informed by Kathi Black 
that an investigator for the [Department] had raised certain issues regarding 
Black's Title, and that she was working to resolve them. 
6. I understand Kathi Black retained the services of [Mr. Diumenti] to 
assist in dealing with the issues raised by the investigator for the 
[Department], and I met with Mr. Diumenti to discuss issues regarding a 
possible sale of Black's Title to another title insurance company. 
7. I have never seen the Complaint issued by the [Department] in [the 
Adjudicative Proceeding] or the [Notice] until it was obtained and shown to 
me by my counsel today [January 25,1998]. 
8. I have never seen the Complaint or the Notice which was purported 
to be mailed to me on October 9,1997. Mail addressed to me at Black's 
Title or at my home was not being given to me by the staff at Black's Title, 
or by any other person during this time period. 
9. Neither Kathi Black nor Mr. Diumenti or any other person at Black's 
Title ever provided me with notification of the Complaint or Notice, or of 
any obligation on my part to respond to any proceeding before the 
[Commissioner]. 
10. To the extent there was a proceeding which required any formal 
response, and I knew of no such proceeding, I reasonably relied upon Mr. 
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Diumenti to attend to any legal requirements and to make such response as 
was necessary on my behalf. 
11. I have been living in Cache Valley and have not been recently 
informed of any matters relating to Black's Title. 
12. I learned of the entry of Default and Default Judgment by the 
[Commissioner] only just prior to the filing in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Davis County of a complaint seeking to enforce the Default 
Judgment. 
13. I have meritorious defenses to the Complaint. 
(R. at 35-36) 
An additional memorandum on the Motion was filed by Black's Title and Kathi 
Black (R. 18 & 29), and the Department filed responses to all the memoranda (R. 24 & 
53) 
On April 16,1998, John E. Braun, an employee of the Department and the 
presiding officer in the Adjudicative Proceeding, and the person to whom the Motion was 
addressed, entered an order denying the motion to set aside the default and default 
judgment. (R. 64-66) Mr. Braun found that the Motion had requested relief under Rule 
60(b), but determined that of the grounds set out in the seven5 subsections of Rule 60(b) 
for setting aside judgments, the Motion had asserted facts that could possibly constitute 
grounds under only subsection (1), but that the facts asserted had fallen short of meeting 
the requirements for granting relief under subsection (1). In particular, Mr. Braun found 
that with respect to possible grounds of mistake, the Black Respondents had not alleged 
5
 In 1998, Rule 60 was amended to delete former subsection (b)(4), which 
provided as grounds for setting aside a judgment the summons not being personally 
served upon a person as required by Rule 4(e), and that person failing to appear in the 
action. 
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mistakes were made in the delivery of the Notice and Complaint, but had alleged that 
mistakes were made by Mr. Diumenti. However, Mr. Braun found that the Black 
Respondents had "provided no statement from the attorney nor any other evidence to 
support the allegation that their attorney made mistakes in his handling of the complaint." 
With respect possible grounds under to "excusable neglect", Mr. Braun found with 
respect to Mr. Black that he had failed to comply with the statutory requirement to keep 
the Department advised of his home address, but that the Department's administrative 
rule provided for service at the business address, and that Mr. Black hadn't presented any 
evidence "to indicate that his illness was so incapacitating as to render him unable to 
effect a change of address with the [Department] or unable to keep himself apprised of 
the activities of his business." (R. 64-65) 
Black's Title and Kathi Black then filed a "Request for Agency Review" (R. at 
68), as did Mr. Black (R. at 71), asking the Commissioner to reverse Mr. Braun's 
decision. On July 20,1998, Neal Gooch, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, acting on 
behalf of, and under designation by, the Commissioner, entered his "Order of Review", in 
which he denied the requests for agency review that had been filed by Black's Title and 
Kathi Black, and by Mr.ald Black. Specifically with respect to Mr. Black, Mr. Gooch 
found that Mr. Black was aware he needed to defend himself and Black's Title, he had 
relied on Mr. Diumenti to respond on his behalf, he did not diligently act or communicate 
with Mr. Diumenti about the Adjudicative Proceeding, the failure of Mr. Diumenti to 
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respond was within the control of Mr. Black, and that through diligence and 
communication with Mr. Diumenti, Mr. Black could have ensured a response was made, 
and that Mr. Black's actions constituted a failure to defend himself diligently and 
therefore his conduct and the failure of Mr. Diumenti to respond on Mr. Black's behalf 
was not to be excused. The Commissioner adopted Mr. Gooch's findings and order. (R. 
at 114) 
On August 20,1998, Mr.ald Black filed a "Petition for Review of Agency Action" 
with the Court of Appeals. (R. at 120) Black's Title and Kathi Black did not appeal Mr. 
Gooch's order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lower courts are given great latitude in deciding whether to set aside defaults and 
default judgments under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b), and their decisions will not be overturned 
unless there has been an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will generally only 
be found it the trier of facts failed to set aside the judgment if three conditions exist. 
While Mr. Black met two of the requirements, he did not present any facts that would 
require the default and default judgment to be set aside under any of the provisions of 
Rule 60(b). 
The Department commenced this action through the Notice and Complaint, both of 
which were served by mailing copies of each to Mr. Black at his business and home 
addresses. Both addresses were on file with the Department, as required by statute. The 
16 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for the commencement of adjudicative 
proceedings by mailing a copy of the Notice to interested parties. Service was complete 
upon Mr. Black through the mailings. 
Although only required to place a notice of adjudicative proceedings in the regular 
mail to commence the proceeding, the Department mailed the Notice and Complaint to 
Mr. Black via certified mail, return receipt requested, and mailed a courtesy copy to his 
home address. In addition, Mr. Black is married to Kathi Black, another of the Black 
Respondents to the Adjudicative Proceeding, and Mr. Black and Kathi Black own Black's 
Title, the third party to the Adjudicative Proceeding. Certified copies of the Notice and 
Complaint, along with a return receipt request, were mailed to Kathi Black and to Black's 
Title at the business address of each on file with the Department. The return receipt for 
service on Black's Title was returned to the Department, signed by a Black's Title 
employee. A courtesy copy of the Notice and Complaint was also mailed to Kathi Black 
at the home address she had on file with the Department. Finally, a courtesy copy of the 
Notice and Complaint was mailed to an attorney who had contacted the Department on 
behalf of Kathi Black and Black's Title on the Department's investigation of Black's 
Title within a month before the Notice and Complaint were mailed. The efforts by the 
Department to provide notice to Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title went beyond 
what was required by UAPA. 
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Mr. Black had a statutory duty to keep the Department advised of his current home 
address and business address. To the extent he did not receive service of the Notice or 
Complaint because he had changed one of those addresses, and he did not notify the 
Department of the change, his conduct is not a "mistake" or "excusable neglect" under 
Rule 60(b) such that the default and default judgment should be set aside. 
Negligence of an attorney will be imputed to the client if the client is also 
responsible for the negligence. Mr. Black was president of Black's Title, and Kathi Black 
was vice-president. Mr. Black had been told by his wife of the Department's 
investigation of Black's Title, and he understood Kathi Black had retained a certain 
attorney to assist her in dealing with the Department on the investigation. Mr. Black also 
met with that same attorney regarding the possible sale of Black's Title to another 
company, but says he was never told by that attorney or Kathi Black about any 
Adjudicative Proceeding. However, Mr. Black does not indicate he ever asked the 
attorney or Kathi Black about the Department's investigation, despite the investigation 
being of the company he and his wife owned and of which he was president. Mr. Black 
asserts there was no agency relationship between himself and the attorney, but if so, Mr. 
Black was negligent in not inquiring into the status of the Department's investigation. 
Mr. Black also asserts that to the extent he was required to respond to the Adjudicative 
Proceeding, he reasonably relied on the attorney to prepare the proper response. Since 
Mr. Black never communicated with the attorney to let the attorney know he was 
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representing Mr. Black, Mr. Black himself was as negligent as the attorney in not 
responding to the Notice and Complaint. 
Mr. Black says he was under a doctor's care and unable to work at Black's Title 
during the time when the Notice and Complaint were served. He also says he was not 
being given his mail addressed to him at home or at work. He admits, however, that he 
went into Black's Title, although only on occasion, and then only for a few minutes each 
time. Nonetheless, Mr. Black was able to go into Black's Title on occasion, to discuss the 
possible sale of Black's Title with the attorney, and to change his residence at some point. 
Illness alone is not sufficient to qualify as "mistake" or "excusable neglect" under Rule 
60(b)(1) unless it is shown to be incapacitating, and Mr. Black has not asserted such facts. 
If facts asserted would constitute grounds under one of the five subsections of Rule 
60(b), those same facts may not be used as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). All of 
the facts asserted by Mr. Black as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) are really facts 
that relate to grounds under Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), and therefore may not be asserted to 
support grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Mr. Black was given notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding pursuant to statute, and 
personal service was not required. His failure to respond was due to "mistake" or 
"excusable neglect", as shown by his arguments asking for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Therefore, his claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for failure to receive actual notice must 
be rejected. 
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Mr. Black asserts new evidence has been uncovered, but a claim of new evidence 
must be brought under Rule 60(b)(2), not Rule 60(b)(6). Therefore, the claim of new 
evidence as grounds for relief under rule 60(b)(6) must be denied. 
Finally, Mr. Black asserts that because by taking his license, his livelihood is being 
taken away, and thus his constitutional rights are being deprived by not affording him a 
hearing. Mr. Black was given notice in the Complaint that the Department would seek to 
have his license revoked, and he was afforded the opportunity for a hearing on that issue. 
Through mistake or neglect caused by himself, he defaulted on the opportunity for that 
hearing. A licensee must comply with the laws that pertain to the license, and of the 
entity that regulates the licensee. Again, Mr. Black's facts really pertain to a "mistake" or 
"excusable neglect", and as such are properly brought under Rule 60(b)(1). Therefore, 
Mr. Black's claim for relief on these facts under Rule 60(b)(6) must be denied. 
The decision of the Department not to set aside the default and default judgment 
must be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Department Correctly Denied the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the 
Default and Default Judgment Because the Motion Did Not Present Facts 
That Would Support A Setting Aside of the Default and Default Judgment 
Under Rule 60(b)(1). 
The Presiding Officer and the Commissioner both reviewed the motions filed by 
Mr. Black to set aside the default and default judgment. Both found that the only grounds 
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under Rule 60(b) to which the facts asserted in the motions to set aside could relate were 
Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6). Mr. Black's brief likewise only argues relief should be 
granted under those two subsections. The Presiding Officer and the Commissioner 
further both found that of the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1), no facts were asserted in 
the motion that could be said to be arguing for "inadvertence" or "surprise", leaving only 
"mistake" and "excusable neglect" as possible grounds under Rule 60(b)(1). In his brief, 
Mr. Black also argues for relief only under the "mistake" or "excusable neglect" 
provisions of Rule 60(b)(1). 
UAPA allows a person against whom default has been entered in an adjudicative 
proceeding to move to set aside the default in accordance with the provisions of the Utah 
Code of Civil Procedure. (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l l(3)(a).) Thus a party against 
whom a default judgment has been entered may move to have the default set aside under 
Rule 60(b), and agency personnel must try to rule on such matters in the same manner a 
court would rule. 
In deciding whether to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b), the court that 
granted the default judgment is given great latitude, and an appellate court will not 
overturn the decision of the lower court unless there is an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. 
Buhler. 957 P.2d 205 (Utah 1998). Abuse of discretion will generally not be found unless 
the party seeking to set aside the default judgment can show there are grounds under any 
of the provisions of Rule 60(b)(l)-(6), that the motion was timely, and that the party has a 
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meritorious defense. State v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053,1055-56 (Utah 1983). 
Although Mr. Black filed a timely motion under Rule 60(b) with the trier of facts (the 
Department), and, under Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders. Inc., 882 P.2d 
1147 (Utah 1994), he has asserted a "meritorious defense", he failed to show facts which 
would warrant relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b). 
A. Service of Notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding on Mr. Black Was 
Complete When the Notice and Complaint Were Placed in the Mail; 
Personal Service Was Not Required. 
The Department commenced the Adjudicative Proceeding in the manner required 
by § 63-46b-3 (1997) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") (Chapter 
46a, Title 63, Utah Code Ann. (1997)). The relevant parts of that section read as follows: 
Section 63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by * * *• 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; * * * 
* * * * * 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a 
presiding officer, and shall include: 
* * * * * 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed: 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted * * * formally according to the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 
63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement 
that each respondent must file a written response within 30 davs of the mailing 
date of the notice of agency action: 
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(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing 
is required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be 
held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the 
hearing may be hqld in default; 
* * * * * 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each partv: 
* * * * * 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has 
a right to notice under statute or rule, 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Department's Notice met all of the statutory requirements. The Department 
served the Notice on the Black Respondents in the manner set forth in the UAPA. UAPA 
does not require personal service of process. To read such a requirement into UAPA 
would defeat the purpose of the clear language of § 63-46b-3(l). 
No cases have been found where a court addressed the question as to whether 
personal service was required to be made on a person where a statute provided that 
service could be completed by mailing addressed to the person's address. However, a 
somewhat similar circumstance to the present case was addressed in Anderson v. Pub. 
Service Commission. 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992). The Public Service Commission 
("PSC") issued an order fining Anderson, and informing him the fine would have to be 
paid within 60 days or his common carrier license would be revoked. The order was 
mailed via certified mail as required by statute. The mail carrier made several attempts to 
deliver the letter, but Anderson refused to claim his mail, and the letter was returned to 
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the PSC. When Anderson did not pay the fine, his license was revoked. Anderson 
contended that after the letter was returned to the PSC, the PSC had a duty to take 
additional steps to ensure he had received the order. The Court rejected Anderson's 
argument, pointing out the Motor Carrier Act mandated all common carriers keep on file 
with the PSC a written notice of the name and address of a person on whom process could 
be served, and that the Act required that service be by certified mail. "The most 
burdensome form of service articulated is certified mail. Thus, we can infer that, at most, 
the legislature intended that the Commission be obligated to serve its orders by certified 
mail, not by personal service." (839 P.2d at 825.) 
As in Anderson. Mr. Black was required to keep on file with the Department his 
business and home addresses, and to keep them current. As in Anderson, as well, a 
license and a livelihood were at stake. Finally, as in Anderson, the Department complied 
with a statute that did not require personal service of process, but rather allowed service 
by mail. 
B. The Department Provided Notice to Mr. Black in Excess of the Notice 
Requirements of UAPA. 
Not only did the Department comply with the notice requirements of UAPA, it 
went far beyond what UAPA requires in attempting to provide Mr. Black, Kathi Black, 
and Black's Title with actual notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding. 
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Every licensee of the Department is required to keep on file with the Department a 
current principal place of business address, and all individuals who are licensees must 
also provide the Department with a current home address. A licensee is further required 
to notify the Department of any change in any address within thirty (30) days of the 
change. (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-312(l)) In light of this statutory requirement of 
licensees to keep current addresses on file, the Department had no problem in mailing the 
Notice and Complaint to addresses the Department had every right to believe were 
current addresses of the Black Respondents, and where the Department had every right to 
expect the copies of the Notice and Complaint would be delivered to the addressees. 
Had this been a case where the Department had sent the Notice and Complaint to 
an address the Department knew was likely stale, the Department might have been subject 
to some criticism if it had not used reasonable means to try to locate a more current 
address for Mr. Black. Even so, the Department would not have been required to serve 
Mr. Black personally. Service by mail, and service by publication in a newspaper of 
general circulation - which is even less personal than service by mail - are the only 
means of service provided for in § 63-46b-2(b). There is simply no requirement for 
personal service of process. 
When an agency commences an adjudicative proceeding, UAPA only requires the 
agency to "mail the notice of agency action to each party." UAPA does not require that 
notice to be sent to every known address of a party, or that notice be sent via any method 
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other than the ordinary United States mail. The Department, though, didn't just mail the 
Notice and Complaint to Mr. Black at the business address he had on file with the 
Department; the Department also mailed the Notice and Complaint to Mr. Black's wife, 
Kathi Black, and to the title agency Mr. Black and Kathi Black owned, Black's Title. 
Additionally, these three mailings were all sent via certified mai1, with return receipt 
requests, and the return receipt mailed to Black's Title was signed and returned to the 
Department. Then, to be certain Mr. Black and Kathi Black received notice of the 
Adjudicative Proceeding, courtesy copies of the Notice and Complaint were sent to Mr. 
Black at his home address on file with the Department, to Kathi Black at her home 
address on file with the Department, and to George Diumenti, an attorney who, by the 
Black Respondents' admission, had communicated with Department personnel regarding 
Black's Title only a short time prior to the commencement of the Adjudicative 
Proceedings. None of the mailings were ever returned to the Department undelivered. 
Given the foregoing, the Department would not have had any reason to know that 
Mr. Black would not receive notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding through the mail. In 
fact, the Department would probably have reason to have thought it had engaged in 
overkill in its efforts to notify Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title - individually 
and collectively - of the Adjudicative Proceeding. 
Even so, the Department provided service on Mr. Black in the only manner 
required or even authorized by UAPA. The Department was not required to serve Mr. 
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Black personally, or to contact him in any manner to make certain he had in fact received 
a copy of the Notice and Complaint through the mail. In light of this, Mr. Black is 
deemed to have been served with the Notice. 
C. Any Failure of Mr. Black to Receive a Copies of the Notice and 
Complaint Is Due to Mr. Black's Own Culpability. 
Mr. Black asserts he did not receive the Notice and Complaint mailed to him by 
the Department. If true, the failure was due to his own deliberate actions or inactions. In 
light of this, there are no grounds under Rule 60(b)(1) which would entitle Mr. Black to 
have the default and default judgment set aside. 
1. Mr. Black Failed to Keep a Current Home and Business Address 
on File with the Department. 
As discussed above, Mr. Black was required by statute to keep on file with the 
Department a current home and business address, and to provide notice to the Department 
within 30 days of any change in either address. In his affidavit, Mr. Black makes three 
statements regarding his home and business addresses: 
* * * * * 
4. During the last half of 1997,1 was at the business office of Black's Title at 
110 West Center Street, Bountiful, Utah, only on a few occasions and then only for 
a few minutes each. 
* * * * * 
8, I never received the Complaint or the Notice which was purported to be 
mailed to me on October 9,1997. Mail addressed to me at Black's Title or at my 
home was not being given to me by the staff at Black's Title, by Kathi Black, or by 
any other person during this time period. 
* * * * * 
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11. I have been living in Cache Valley and have not been recently 
informed of any matters relating to the business of Black's Title. 
[R. at 35-36] 
Mr. Black's affidavit does not indicate he had a new place of business, but rather 
implies his place of business was still at Black's Title. If this is correct, Mr. Mr. Black 
was not required to inform the Department of a new business address, since there was no 
change in that address. On the other hand, since Mr. Black didn't have a new business 
address, the Department clearly had the right to expect that a Notice and Complaint 
mailed to that address would be received by Mr. Black. The purpose of requiring 
licensees to keep a current business address on file with the Department is for situations 
just like this - so the Department has a reliable way of contacting the licensees. 
The only explanation Mr. Black has for not receiving the copies of the Notice and 
Complaint that were mailed to him at his business address is that he was not being given 
mail by the employees of Black's Title, a business he and his wife own. However, he 
does not state whether he ever asked any of the employees if he had any mail, which one 
would expect an owner and president of a business to do, especially an owner and 
president who was "at the business office of Black's Title . . . only on a few occasions and 
then only for a few minutes each." To say the least, it rather strains credulity to think a 
person who was an owner and president of a title agency, and one of only two licensed 
title agents at the title agency, but who, being under a doctor's care, was only able to be at 
Black's Title on a Mfewff occasions, and then only for a "few" minutes each time, would 
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not ask if he had any mail. It further strains credulity to think an employee of a business 
would refuse to give the owner and president of the business the mail addressed to that 
person, even if not asked. Mr. Black admits he visited Black's Title during the last half of 
1997, even if it was "only on a few occasions and then only for a few minutes each"; 
therefore, he was present on occasion, even if only for a few minutes, at the business 
address to which the official copies of the Notice and Complaint were mailed to him. 
Given his position as an owner and president of Black's Title, and his position as one of 
only two title agents on the Black's Title agency license, his failure to pick up his mail 
from his business address cannot be said to have arisen from a "mistake", or to be 
"excusable neglect" on his part. 
Mr. Black also states that he has been living in Cache Valley. The inference Mr. 
Black apparently seems to want drawn is that he wasn't living at his home address when 
the Department mailed the Notice and Complaint to his home, so the Department - or at 
least someone other than Mr. Black - made a mistake by mailing the Notice and 
Complaint to the home address the Department had on file for Mr. Black. 
In response, the Department notes that Mr. Black's affidavit was signed February 
25,1998. He does not say how long he had been living in Cache Valley. Thus there is 
nothing in Mr. Black's affidavit that indicates he was not living at his home address on 
file with the Department when the Department mailed the Notice and Complaint to that 
home address. In addition, to the extent Mr. Black had already moved to Cache Valley 
29 
when the Department mailed the Notice and Complaint to the home address in West 
Bountiful, Mr. Black had a statutory duty to notify the Department of his new home 
address. Since no new home address was filed with the Department, Mr. Black must 
shoulder the responsibility, and the consequences, for the Department's mailing the 
Notice and Complaint to a home address where Mr. Black did not live. 
As noted above, the "official" Notice and Complaint were mailed to Mr. Black's 
business address, and were sent via certified mail. The copies of the Notice and 
Complaint sent to Mr. Black at his home address were only courtesy copies. Thus even if 
the Department had made a "mistake" in sending the Notice and Complaint to a home 
address where Mr. Black no longer lived, the "mistake" would have been harmless, since 
the official copies had been mailed to Mr. Black's business address. 
Furthermore, after default and default judgment were entered, a copy of the default 
and default judgment was mailed to Mr. Black at his business address, as well as to Kathi 
Black at her business address, and to Black's Title. An additional copy was mailed to 
George Diumenti. Thus at least three mailings regarding this Adjudicative Proceeding 
were mailed to Mr. Black at addresses he had on file with the Department. Three others 
were mailed to his wife, Kathi Black, two were mailed to Black's Title, and two were 
mailed to George Diumenti, who at that time may or may not have been representing 
Black's Title or Kathi Black or Mr. Black or any combination of the three. 
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Current business and home addresses are required on file with the Department for 
just this reason. If the Department needs to contact an agent or an agency, it doesn't do 
the Department any good to send a communication to an invalid address, and only results 
in a waste of time and money. The failure of an agent to keep current business and home 
addresses on file with the Department is a deliberate failure by the agent, and not the 
Department. 
In summary, the Department sent copies of the Notice and Complaint to Mr. Black 
at the home and business addresses he had on file with the Department. If Mr. Black did 
not receive any of those copies of the Notice or Complaint, the fault lies with him, and 
not with the Department, Mr. Diumenti, or anyone else. 
2. Whether Mr. Diumenti Was or Was Not Representing Mr. Black 
Personally Is Irrelevant, Since Mr. Blacks Negligence Far 
Exceeds Any Negligence That Might Be Attributed to 
Mr. Diumenti. 
The negligence of an attorney will be imputed to the client in a Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion if the client's conduct is also culpable. Walker v. Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). The record in this case leaves no doubt that to the extent George 
Diumenti may have been negligent in not filing an answer, Mr. Black is even more 
culpable. 
To begin with, it is difficult to understand exactly what Mr. Black's position on his 
relationship with Mr. Diumenti. In his affidavit, Mr. Black says he met with Mr. 
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Diumenti to discuss the possible sale of Black's Title to another title insurance company, 
which would indicate Mr. Diumenti was representing Mr. Black in some manner, even if 
only as an owner and officer of Black's Title. Mr. Black also says in his affidavit that 
"To the extent there was a formal proceeding which required any formal response, I 
reasonable relied upon Mr. Diumenti to attend to any legal requirements and to make 
such response as was necessary on my behalf." (R. at 36.) Yet Mr. Black also argues that 
there was no clear evidence there was an agency relationship between Mr. Black and Mr. 
Diumenti. The only concrete understanding one can have of this relationship is that there 
was confusion as to the nature of the relationship, and Mr. Black is plainly more 
responsible for that confusion - and any negligence in failing to respond to the Notice and 
Complaint - as Mr. Diumenti. 
Mr. Black and Kathi Black owned Black's Title. They were the only licensed title 
agents on the license of Black's Title. Mr. Black was also president of Black's Title. As 
such, Mr. Black had a duty to be aware of the business dealings of Black's Title- a duty 
he could not abandon. 
Mr. Black admits that he was informed by Kathi Black in the Fall of 1997 that the 
Department was investigating Black's Title. A prudent owner and president of a 
company in a highly regulated industry like insurance would have made at least some 
inquiry as to what the Department was investigating. One phone call to the Department 
would have informed Mr. Black of the nature of the investigation. Instead, Mr. Black 
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chose to do nothing personally. Instead, he only says he understood Kathi Black was 
working to resolve the problem. 
Mr. Black makes the following statement in his affidavit: 
6. I understand Kathi Black retained the services of George S. 
Diumenti II ("Mr. Diumenti") to assist in dealing with the issues raised by 
the investigator for the Utah Insurance Department, and I met with Mr. 
Diumenti to discuss issues regarding a possible sale of Black's Title to 
another title insurance company. 
(R.at35) 
Although this statement isn't clear as to whether Mr. Black is asserting Kathi 
Black met with Mr. Diumenti before, after, or at approximately the same time Mr. Black 
was meeting with Mr. Diumenti, it seems to indicate Mr. Black met with Mr. Diumenti 
after Mr. Black had understood Kathi Black was meeting with Mr. Diumenti to assist with 
the Department's investigation. Regardless of the sequence, however, the inference is 
that apparently supposed to be drawn is that when Mr. Black met with Mr. Diumenti, they 
did not discuss the Department's investigation, even though Mr. Black was aware at the 
time he was meeting with Mr. Diumenti that the Department had an investigation of 
Black's Title in progress, and Kathi Black had retained Mr. Diumenti to assist in dealing 
with those issues. The failure of Mr. Black to make any inquiry of Mr. Diumenti 
regarding the Department's investigation is not excusable neglect; it can only be 
described as a willful failure of Mr. Black to fulfil his responsibilities as the owner and 
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president of Black's Title, and one of the two title agents on the title agency license of 
Black's Title. 
Giving Mr. Black the benefit of the doubt that he and Mr. Diumenti did not discuss 
the Department's investigation, one can only conclude that Mr. Black was negligent in 
not discussing the investigation with Mr. Diumenti. Mr. Black was an owner and 
president of Black's Title. Furthermore, he was one of only two licensed title agents on 
Black's Title's agency license. As such, he had a duty to Black's Title to inform himself 
about the Department's investigation. If he understood Mr. Diumenti was assisting in 
dealing with the Department's investigation, he had a duty to inquire of Mr. Diumenti, 
either when meeting with him or at any other time, as to what was going on with respect 
to the investigation. While Mr. Diumenti may have been negligent in not communicating 
with Mr. Black, Mr. Black was at least equally as negligent in not communicating with 
Mr. Diumenti. 
If there was an agency relationship between Mr. Black and Mr. Diumenti, then any 
negligence due to Mr. Diumenti would be attributable to Mr. Black. Russell v. MartelL 
681 P.2d 1193, 1995 (Utah 1984); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp. 656 P.2d 
429 (Utah 1982). If there was not an agency relationship, Mr. Black's negligence 
nonetheless far exceeds any negligence that may be imputed to Mr. Diumenti. 
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3. Mr. Black's Illness Is Not By Itself Enough to Support a Setting 
Aside of the Default and Default Judgment for "Excusable 
Neglect". 
Illness alone is not "excusable neglect" for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Something 
more must be shown to indicate the illness was such that the person could not respond to 
the pleadings. 
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 269 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953), the defendant moved to 
have a default and default judgment set aside under Rule 60(b). Among the grounds 
asserted were that the person who received service on behalf of the defendant corporation 
had been seriously ill and did not notify the other interested parties. In rejecting this 
ground, the Court stated, "We are not told the nature of the illness and it does not appear 
that the appellant... was so incapacitated that he could not have called an attorney to 
have his rights and the rights of the corporation protected. * * * Illness alone is not 
sufficient to make neglect in defending one's actions excusable. * * *" (269 P.2d at 743; 
citations omitted.) 
In the instant matter, Mr. Black doesn't even directly assert he was or is ill; he only 
asserts he was and is under a doctor's care, and that he was unable to work. There is no 
indication, though, that the nature of his malady was such that he was incapable of 
responding to the Notice and Complaint. Without this type of information, a mere 
assertion that he was under a doctor's care at the time is not enough to set aside the 
default and default judgment for "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1). 
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What Mr. Black does state in his affidavit, though, is very revealing about his 
capabilities. He was able to go into Black's Title on a few occasions, even if only for a 
few minutes each time. (Query as to the meaning of "few" in this context.) He was able 
to understand from his wife that the Department had commenced an investigation of 
Black's Title, and that his wife had retained Mr. Diumenti to assist in dealing with that 
investigation. He was able to meet with Mr. Diumenti to discuss the possible sale of 
Black's Title to another title insurance company. He was apparently able to move from 
his home in West Bountiful to Cache Valley. Finally, upon learning of the default and 
default judgment, he was able immediately to retain separate legal counsel and assist in 
preparing a motion to set aside the default. 
None of the foregoing is meant to belittle Mr. Black or any illness or other 
condition he may have. However, there is no indication in the record that Mr. Black was 
ever so incapacitated that he would have been unable to have responded, or to have 
retained counsel to respond, to the Notice and Complaint. Merely stating he was, and 
continues to be, under a doctor's care and unable to work, is not sufficient grounds for 
finding there was "excusable neglect" such that the default and default judgment should 
be set aside. 
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IL Black's Factual Assertions for Setting Aside the Default Under Rule 60(b)(6) 
Are All Facts That Would Be Grounds for Setting Aside a Judgment Under 
the Specific Reasons Set Forth in Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), and As Such, These 
Asserted Facts May Not Be Used As Grounds for Setting Aside the Judgment 
Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
A. The Facts Asserted by Mr. Black for Setting Aside the Default and 
Default Judgment Are Grounds Under Rule 60(b)(1), and Therefore 
Those Same Facts Cannot be Asserted as Grounds Under Rule 
60(b)(6). 
When the facts asserted by a party for setting aside an order under Rule 60(b) 
constitute grounds under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b), those same facts cannot be asserted 
as grounds under subsection (6) of Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(1) provides that an order may 
be set aside for "(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Likewise, 
subsections (2)-(5) provide specific grounds, just as subsection (1) does. Subsection (6) 
then allows the order to be set aside "(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." 
The courts have uniformly rejected attempts to convert fact situations that fell 
under subsection (1) into subsection (6). Mr. Black asserts the following facts as his 
reasons for not answering or otherwise responding to the Notice and Complaint: he didn't 
receive the mail sent to his business and home addresses; he left Kathi Black to take care 
of the business of Black's Title; he understood Kathi Black had retained George Diumenti 
to assist with the Department's investigation; he was ill. All these factual assertions must 
be considered under the "excusable neglect" provision in subsection (1). Even Mr. 
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Black's motion to set aside the default and default judgment asserts his reasons why the 
judgment should be set aside fall under subsection (1). (R. 41) After making this 
assertion, he then argues that even if the facts asserted therein fail to rise to the level of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect", "they certainly set forth 'other 
reasons' justifying relief from the operation" of the default and default judgment against 
Mr. Black. 
This attempted conversion from grounds under subsection (1) to grounds under 
subsection (6) is, of course, precisely what the courts have said a party may not do. Thus 
the Department correctly refused to consider the factual assertions in any of the 
memoranda accompanying the motions to set aside the default and default judgment as 
having been made under subsection (6) rather than subsection (1). 
B. The Other Facts Asserted as Grounds for Setting Aside the Default and 
Default Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6) Are Just Attempts to 
Characterize the Facts That are Described in Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 
60(b)(2). 
Having failed to set forth facts that show grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), 
Mr. Black attempts to contort those same facts into other grounds under which the relief 
he seeks could be granted under Rule 60(b)(6). Each of these alleged grounds is 
discussed below. 
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1. The Department Gave Mr, Black Notice that Default Would Be 
Entered Against Him If He Did Not Answer The Complaint. 
Mr. Black asserts he did not receive any of the copies of the Notice and Complaint 
that were mailed to him at his home and business address, or to his company, Black's 
Title, at the business address of Black's Title. As a result, he says he was not given 
notice by the Insurance Department of the Department's intent to seek default and default 
judgment against him. This obviously is just an attempt to recast the facts that would lead 
to a request to set aside the default and default judgment under the "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" grounds of subsection (1) and make them 
into facts that can be used to request setting aside under subsection (6). 
Not only must this factual assertion for granting the setting aside of the default and 
default order under subsection (6) be rejected because it is really just an attempt to use the 
same facts that have already been asserted and rejected as grounds for setting aside under 
subsection (1), but the factual assertion itself is incorrect. The Notice warned that failure 
of the party to respond to the Complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of mailing 
could result in default being entered. Thus Mr. Black was given notice that default could 
be entered against him if he failed to file an answer to the Complaint within the allotted 
time. 
The argument of Mr. Black that the default and default judgment should be set 
aside because both were entered on the first day they could be entered must also be 
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rejected. The entry of default and default judgment on the first day they could be entered 
is not a ground for setting aside the default and default judgment. A default will not be 
set aside without a showing of good cause under Rule 55, and a default judgment will not 
be set aside absent a showing of one of the reasons in Rule 60(b). In Bd. of Education v. 
£fix, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963), the complaint was served on September 10,1962, and 
default judgment was entered on October 5,1962. Assuming a typical 20-day summons 
was used, the default judgment would have been entered within three to four days of the 
date the answer was due. In denying a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default 
judgment, the Court stated that to grant a Rule 60(b) motion for excusable neglect, "the 
excuse must be reasonable to constitute excusable neglect." (384 P.2d at 807). Not 
finding the excuse reasonable, the Court refused to reverse the finding of the trial court 
that the Rule 60(b) motion should be denied. 
Everything the Department did in obtaining the default and default judgment 
complied with the applicable statutes and rules. As pointed out above, six different sets 
of the Notice and Complaint were served by mail, and none of them were returned as 
undeliverable. Five of those sets went to a husband and wife and the business they jointly 
owned. The other set went to an attorney who had seemingly represented at least one of 
those parties in matters before the Department within a few months before the Notice and 
Complaint were mailed. Yet no response was received from any of the parties. Nor was 
an appearance entered by anyone on behalf of any of the parties. When no one appeared 
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or answered the Complaint, the entry of default and default judgment on the day after the 
last day for filing a Complaint was entirely proper. 
Mr. Black cites two cases for the thesis that defaults and default judgments should 
not be entered on the first day after the deadline for filing answers. Ruggiero v. Phillips, 
378 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), and Mover v. Americana Mobile Homes. Inc. 368 
A.2d 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). These cases are instructive, but for reasons other than 
those cited by Mr. Black. First, Mr. Black admits he could find no Utah cases stating that 
it is improper for a default and default judgment to be entered on the first day possible. 
Rather, Mr. Black has to cite two cases from the Pennsylvania Superior Court from the 
late 1970s. Even in those cases, the courts acknowledge there is nothing improper about 
one party's obtaining a "snap judgment", as those courts put it. However, in both of those 
cases cited, counsel for the party obtaining the "snap judgment" also had been in 
conversations with counsel for the other party, and counsel for the other party had been 
led to believe additional time had been granted to respond to the complaint. Thus there 
were independent reasons for those courts to set aside the defaults and default judgments 
in those cases. 
Evidence was also presented in both of the Pennsylvania cases that the "norm* in 
the county where the cases were tried was for counsel the counsel who had obtained a 
default to contact the other party's counsel prior to obtaining a default judgment on the 
default. Even then, both of those courts recognized there was no judicial rule requiring 
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such notification. Since there were other reasons, though, why the default and default 
judgments should be set aside, and because evidence had been presented that the norm in 
the county where the default had been entered was for the counsel for the party obtaining 
the default to call the counsel for the other party before seeking default judgment, those 
courts determined that such contact should be made prior to obtaining a default judgment. 
Contrasting those two Pennsylvania cases with Utah law, no cases or judicial rules 
have been located that require counsel for a party obtaining a default to contact counsel 
for the other defaulted party prior to obtaining a default judgment. Furthermore, unlike 
the Pennsylvania cases, there was no counsel for the other party for the Department to 
contact, because no appearances had been entered, and no one had contacted the 
Department regarding this matter. Finally, no evidence was presented in either the 
motions to set aside the default and default judgment or the motions for agency review 
that the "norm" in Utah is for contact to be made with the defaulted party or counsel for 
the defaulted party prior to obtaining a default judgment. 
Finally, had the Department waited a significant number of days after obtaining 
default before it obtained default judgment, none of the other facts in this matter would 
have been altered. The Department's records show that in addition to mailing copies of 
the Notice and Complaint to Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title at the business 
address of each, and to Mr. Black and Kathi Black at their home addresses, and to Mr. 
Diumenti, a copy of the order of default and default judgment was mailed on November 
42 
12,1997, to Mr. Black, Kathi Black, and Black's Title at the business address of each, 
and to Mr. Diumenti. Yet Kathi Black stated she did not know about the default until 
shortly after January 18,1998, and Mr. Black stated he did not know about the default 
and default judgment until just prior to an action being filed in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County. In light of the "non-receipi" of the mailings by the 
Department, the Department could have had default entered on November 12,1997, and 
waited another 60 days until January 12,1998, or so, and had default judgment entered on 
that date, and it wouldn't have affected anything in the Adjudicative Proceeding; if Mr. 
Black and Kathi Black didn't know about the default judgment that had been entered on 
November 12,1997, there is no reason to believe they would have been any better 
informed had the Department obtained the default judgment on January 12,1998, and 
mailed notice of the default judgment to them the next day. 
In summary on this point, then, the attempt to cast the actions of the Department as 
obtaining default and default judgment without giving proper notice to Mr. Black is an 
attempt to fashion a Rule 60(b)(1) motion into a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, which the courts 
have solidly rejected. In addition, Mr. Black was informed in the Notice that default 
would be entered against him. Finally, there was nothing improper about the Department 
obtaining default and default judgment against Mr. Black on the first day after the last day 
for filing an answer when no answer was filed. 
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2. The Claim of Newly Discovered Evidence Must Be Rejected 
Because It is Raised for the First Time in This Appeal, and Is a 
Claim that Fits Within Rule 60(b)(2). 
The claim of newly discovered evidence is raised for the first time in this appeal. 
No such claim was raised in the motions to set aside the default and default judgments, or 
in the motions for agency review. In all likelihood, this claim was not raised before the 
appellate proceedings before the Department because Mr. Black was not aware of the new 
evidence until after those appeals had been presented and decided. Nonetheless, while 
such a harsh rule might work a hardship from time to time, as perhaps happened in this 
case, some finality must be available in a case, and Rule 60(b)(2) provides that a party has 
3 months after entry of a judgment in which to assert there is new evidence which a 
tribunal should consider in setting aside a judgment. As Mr. Black did not assert such a 
claim before the Department, or within 3 months of the entry of the default and default 
judgment, this claim must be rejected. 
In addition, a claim for relief for newly discovered evidence is properly brought 
under Rule 60(b)(2), which provides for exactly that. "Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may 
not be premised on one of the specific grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b)(lH5).,f In Re 
GledhilL 76 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 1996), citing Lilieberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition 
Corp.. 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988). 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Black's request for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for 
newly discovered evidence must be rejected. 
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3. The Department Afforded Mr. Black Every Due Process Right to 
Which He Was Entitled in the Adjudicative Proceeding Before 
the Department. 
The Department complied completely with the procedures under UAPA for 
initiating and serving notice of the Adjudicative Proceeding on Mr. Black. As has been 
noted throughout, the Department even took the extra steps of sending copies of the 
Notice and Complaint via certified mail to Mr. Black, to Kathi Black, and to Black's Title 
at their business addresses, and then sent additional courtesy copies to Mr. Black and to 
Kathi Black at their home address. Yet Mr. Black would now have the court believe the 
Department had violated his due process rights. 
Once more, this is an attempt to convert a motion that should have been - and was 
- brought under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b) rather than subsection (6). Mr. Black is 
saying he is being deprived of his livelihood because his license as an insurance agent 
was taken away without due process because he was denied a hearing before his license 
was revoked. As shown above, the Department did afford Mr. Black the opportunity of a 
hearing before revoking his license. That was the whole point of the Adjudicative 
Proceeding, for which a copy of the Notice and Complaint was mailed to Mr. Black. He 
simply defaulted on having that hearing through the actions described above under the 
discussion of relief sought under Rule 60(b)(1). Since this claim was properly brought 
under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b), it cannot now be reasserted under subsection (6). 
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Turning to the substance of the claim, this case is not like Klapprott v. United 
States. 335 U.S. 601, modified 335 U.S. 631, motion for clarification of modified 
judgment denied 336 U.S. 949 (1949), cited by Mr. Black. In simplified terms, in that 
case, Klapprott, a naturalized citizen was served with notice of his deportation 
proceedings before an agency of the United States Government, but before he could 
obtain counsel or file a response, he was arrested by the United States Government. His 
citizenship was revoked when he failed to answer the complaint or to appear at the 
hearing on his citizenship, neither of which he could do because he was in jail. 
Throughout the next 6 years, he was tried and convicted two more times, going from jail 
in one state to jail in another to jail in still another. Eventually all three convictions were 
overturned, but now, out of jail, he found himself about to be deported because he hadn't 
appeared in his deportation hearing 6 years before. The Supreme Court ruled Klapprott's 
due process rights had been violated, pointing out that loss of citizenship was in many 
ways worse than incarceration for criminal violations. They also pointed out that it was 
the same United States Government that was about to deport him that had thrice 
convicted and incarcerated him. Therefore the Court ruled Klapprott should be given a 
hearing on his deportation proceeding. 
Mr. Black's situation is much different than Klapprott's. As pointed out above, the 
Department not only didn't prevent Mr. Black from a hearing before revoking his license, 
the Department went to great lengths to try to provide him with a hearing. Only after Mr. 
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Black failed to respond to the Notice and Complaint did the Department revoke his 
license, a matter the Department does not take lightly. 
Mr. Black's situation is much more akin to that Mr. Anderson in Anderson v. 
Public Service Commission, cited above. In that case, Anderson also argued he was 
constitutionally entitled to actual notice of the PSC's orders. The Court stated: 
* * * We do not believe that the Constitution requires actual notice under these 
circumstances. 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313-14 
(1950), the United States Supreme Court held that to comport with due 
process, notice must be "reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to 
give interested parties an opportunity to protect their interests. Under this 
standard, the proper inquiry focuses on whether the agency "acted reasonably 
in selecting means likely to inform persons affected, not whether each 
[affected person] actually received notice." [cite omitted.] To determine 
whether the agency has acted reasonably in choosing a method of notice, we 
balance the interest sought to be protected against the interest of the agency, 
[cite omitted.]; Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Utah 1987). In 
undertaking this analysis, we focus on whether the method of service strikes 
a reasonable balance between the interests of the agency and the affected 
individual, [cite omitted], while keeping in mind that the state's burden is less 
onerous in administrative proceedings. See Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 
616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) (Hall, J., dissenting) ("The sufficiency of 
'notice' for due process purposes is more limited in administrative matters than 
in other areas of the law."). 
In the instant case, Anderson's interest lies in a certificate of 
convenience and necessity for operating a limousine service. It appears that the 
limousine service is Anderson's source of livelihood. As such, it represents a 
significant interest. On the other hand, the agency has an interest in controlling 
the level of its administrative burden in delivering orders to parties. The 
current practice of delivering orders via certified mail does not place an undue 
burden on the Commission. Unlike personal service, which would require 
substantial time and expense, certified mail is far less costly and less 
personnel-intensive; nevertheless, it is a reliable method of notice. See, e.g., 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1914) (commenting on skill of 
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postal workers in effecting delivery); Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 
643 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1981) (presuming notice-bearing letters reach 
destination). 
Furthermore, the nature and purpose of the relationship between 
certificate holders and the Commission support the adequacy of this type of 
notice. When the Commission grants a certificate of convenience and 
necessity, it gives an individual the authority to operate in a designated 
business (e.g., common carriers). This certificate does not represent an 
unrestricted right. Rather, the Commission may impose reasonable conditions 
with which the certificate holder must comply in return for the privilege of 
retaining the certificate, [cites omitted.] The Commission regulates and 
supervises the certificate holder to ensure that the holder is in compliance with 
the conditions of his or her certificate. This regulatory function requires 
ongoing communication between the Commission and certificate holders; it 
is entirely reasonable to require certificate holders to make themselves 
available to receive regular communications. Thus, the ongoing nature of the 
relationship with certificate holders suggests that the Commission's burden in 
effecting notice is somewhat less onerous in this context than it might be 
outside the regulatory setting. 
In addition, the agency also has a significant interest in ensuring that 
parties do not delay or subvert the administrative process by willfully evading 
notice. If an actual notice standard were required for delivery of Commission 
orders, parties might be encouraged to evade notice. A party fearing an adverse 
outcome could simply refuse to claim his or her mail and then avoid personal 
service. Such a result would be unacceptable. Although some individuals may 
fail to receive notice through no fault of their own, it would be extremely 
burdensome to require the Commission to undertake factual determinations of 
willfulness and fault in every failure to receive notice. 
The legislature appears to have recognized the risk of willful evasion. 
Consequently, it has placed the bulk of the burden of ensuring notice on the 
certificate holders. Section 54-6-14 of the Motor Carrier Act provides, "Every 
common and contract motor carrier shall file with the commission a written 
designation of the name and post office address of a person maintaining a 
residence within this state upon whom service of any process, notice, or order 
may be made." Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-14 (1990). This requirement of 
maintaining a current address on file with the Commission, with the implicit 
corollary of making a diligent effort to collect mail sent to that address, is a 
reasonable burden on the benefit of holding a certificate of convenience and 
necessity. 
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This is particularly true for notice involving orders. Orders generally 
are sent after the party has been involved in some proceeding before the 
Commission or administrative law judge. Thus, the party is aware that actions 
are or may be pending. The party is aware that communications from the 
Commission likely will ensue, and therefore, the party should be diligent in 
retrieving any correspondence from the Commission. 
Given the potential administrative burden and the risk of willful evasion 
inherent in an actual notice standard, we believe that the use of certified mail 
to deliver Commission orders strikes a proper balance between the interests of 
the certificate holder and the interests of the agency. Although certified mail 
will not ensure actual notice in all cases, it is a method reasonably calculated 
to inform certificate holders of Commission orders. 
[839 P.2d at 825-826.] 
The similarities between the positions of the Department and the PSC on the one 
hand, and of Mr. Black and Mr. Anderson on the other, are readily apparent. The 
insurance business is a highly regulated industry. Those who obtain a license from the 
Department must spend many hours studying to prepare to take tests to qualify them for a 
license. The purpose of the long hours of studying and the tests is obviously so the would-
be agents can learn what the law is so they can comply with it. After obtaining a license, 
licensees must continue to take refresher courses and are subject to great scrutiny to be 
certain they comply with the insurance laws of the State. Yet while the Department wants 
to be certain agents are complying with the law, the Department also understands that an 
insurance license represents a large investment of time and money by the licensee. The 
Department's goal is to make certain agents comply with the insurance laws of the State. 
Generally the Department tries to do this by keeping the agents informed of changes in 
the law or of new interpretations by the Department, or by providing educational 
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opportunities. Sometimes, though, the Department must take action against agents. 
Usually only a reprimand, a fine, or both will be imposed if deemed adequate. On 
occasion, a harsher remedy is needed, which involves suspension or revocation of a 
license. In those instances, the Department takes its responsibility to the citizens of the 
State very seriously to discipline properly those who violate the insurance laws, but the 
Department also understands the investment the Department's licensees have in their 
professions. This is why the Department goes beyond the minimum requirements of 
UAPA for service of process, by mailing copies of notices of commencement of 
Adjudicative Proceeding and complaints through certified mail, and by sending courtesy 
copies to the licensee's home address if the licensee is an individual. 
Mr. Black's constitutional rights were not violated by the Department when it 
revoked his license for failing to respond to the Notice and Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the Department must be affirmed. 
DATED this 0St1\ day of March, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BRYCEIJPETTEY 7 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Utah State Insurance Department 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-312(l) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l 1 
Copies of the three orders on which Petitioner seeks review are included in 
Addendum B of Petitioner's initial brief. 
31A-23-312 INSURANCE CODE 
failed to forward it shall be obligated to the insurer for the entire unp»i« 
premium due under the policy of insurance together with reasonable exp^i 
of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. 
(6) If, under an employee health insurance plan, an employee builds • 
credit for future coverage because the employee has not used the pri^ 
protection, or in some other way, the insurer is obligated to the employee 1* 
that future coverage earned while the policy was in full effect. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-311, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1995 aar?* 
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, § 202; ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Sub^r » 
1987, ch. 95, § 34; 1989, ch. 261, § 29; 1994, (lXbXiv) and made stylistic changes 
ch. 316, § 28; 1995, ch. 344, § 30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction. Although this section passes the coma*. 
This section is specifically directed toward sense definition of insurance regulation v ^ 
the insurance industry; its purpose is to define the meaning of the saving clause of th* Is. 
an insurer's duties to its insured following the ployee Retirement Income Security Act of i r 4 
cancellation of insurance for the non-payment (29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2XA)), it does not M'.*S 
of premium. Gem Ins. Co. v. Edward T. Hayes even one of the three required factors of ih» 
Transporting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 566 (D. Utah McCarran-Ferguson Act test (15 C>f 
1997). §§ 1011-1015) and is therefore not saved frai 
This section is not an integral part of the federal ERISA preemption. Gem Ins Co t 
insurer-insured relationship because it does Edward T. Hayes Transporting, Inc. 9$e F 
not regulate or control the substantive terms of Supp. 566 (D. Utah 1997). 
the insurance contract. Gem Ins. Co. v. Edward 
T. Hayes Transporting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 566 
(D. Utah 1997). 
31A-23-312. Place of business and residence address — 
Records. 
(1) All licensees under this chapter shall register with the commissioner the 
address and telephone numbers of their principal place of business. If the 
licensee is an individual, he shall also provide his residence address anc: 
telephone number. Licensees shall notify the commissioner, in writing, within 
30 days of any change of address or telephone number. 
(2) Except as provided under Subsection (3), every licensee under thu 
chapter shall keep at the principal place of business address registered under 
Subsection (1), a record of all transactions consummated under the Utah 
license. The record shall be in an organized form and shall include all the 
following: 
(a) if the licensee is an agent or broker: 
(i) a record of each insurance contract procured by or issued 
through the licensee, with the names of insurers and insureds, the 
amount of premium and commissions or other compensation, and the 
subject of the insurance; 
(ii) the names of any other agents or brokers from whom business 
is accepted, and of persons to whom commissions or allowances of any 
kind are promised or paid; 
(b) if the licensee is a consultant, a record of each agreement outlining 
the work performed and the fee for the work; 
(c) any additional information which is customary for a similar busi-
ness, or which may reasonably be required by the commissioner by rule 
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(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the 
names or titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility 
for adjudicative proceedings before the agency. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-2, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 258; 1988, ch. 169, § 42. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in lolman v. Salt Lake County Attor-
ney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by 
persons other than the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding 
officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice 
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing 
address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the 
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that 
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the 
mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing 
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing 
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and 
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a 
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time 
provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the 
presiding officer; and 
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(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and 
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be 
decided, 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the 
agency shall: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a 
right to notice under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than 
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for 
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the 
jurisdiction of the agency, or by his representative, and shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the 
request for agency action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which 
agency action is requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief 
or agency action. 
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the 
agency and shall send a copy by mail to each person known to have a direct 
interest in the requested agency action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more printed forms eliciting 
the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for 
agency action when completed and filed by the person requesting agency 
action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency 
action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted 
and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied 
and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the 
party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial; 
or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are re-
quired to determine the agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(dXii) shall contain the 
information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to 
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section. 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3Xd) 
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(dXiii) 
may be published when publication is required by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3Xd)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
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cable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to 
the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46M1; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where 
respondent parties are known, state that a written response must 
be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if mailed, 
or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's 
notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing 
is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the 
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which 
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in 
default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a 
hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted 
by rule and may be requested by a party within the time 
prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing 
and the time within which a hearing may be requested under the 
agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone num-
ber of the presiding officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this 
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or 
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency 
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time prescribed 
by the agenc/s rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by 
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may 
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable 
federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for 
licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not 
considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter. 
<7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or 
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency 
may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the 
award of that license or privilege. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-3, enacted by 
1*7, ch. 161, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
statute as adopted by the legislature, not an 
agency's rules as adopted by the agency. 
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & 
Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Defect in notice. 
—Waiver. 
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of 
notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a 
driver's license suspension hearing, when he 
ANALYSIS 
applicable law. 
**frct in notice. 
-Stiver 
UA&IU&I 
H***iing officer. 
Vpbcable law. 
u P * , r t f e r e n c e to "law applicable" in Subsec-
' • • is a reference to an agency's enabling 
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was faulty when it failed to contain a notice to Cited in USX Corp. v. Industrial Coma • 
petitioner of the right to apply for reconsidera- 781 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). ~ 
tion conferred by former § 61-2-12(l)(b). 
Krantz v. Department of Commerce, 856 P.2d 
369 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
63-46b-ll. Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in 
the adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to attend or 
participate in a properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice, 
or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a 
response under Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the grounds for default 
and shall be mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default 
order, and any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to 
the default order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be 
made to the presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section 63-46M2, 
or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the 
presiding officer on the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudi-
cative proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party 
in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, 
conduct any further proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative 
proceeding without the participation of the party in default and shall 
determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the 
agency and the party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing 
the order of default, dismiss the proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-ll, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21. 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 30 
days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity designated 
for that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
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